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# Jubayer Mahmud

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Graduate research assistant, Forte-Research Group, Computer Science  
Virginia Tech

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## RESEARCH INTERESTS

With 6+ years of experience in hardware-oriented system security, my expertise encompasses a wide range of interests, including the security of systems, firmware, and hardware. My current research is centered on leveraging architectural and low-level hardware behaviors to develop system-level attack and defense strategies. This includes work on Trusted Execution Environments (TEE), side-channel attacks, cloud FPGA security, and the creation of innovative frameworks for anti-counterfeit chip detection and avoidance.

## EDUCATION

**PhD, Computer Engineering, Virginia Tech, USA** 08/19–05/24  
*Thesis: Designing Attacks and Defenses leveraging SRAM Data Remanence* **Advisor:** Dr. Matthew Hicks  
**MS, Electrical & Computer Engineering, Auburn University, AL, USA** 08/17–08/19  
*Thesis: Towards Unclonable System Design for Resource-Constrained Applications* **Advisor:** Dr. Ujjwal Guin  
**BS, Electrical & Electronic Engineering (EEE)** 03/16  
Bangladesh University of Engineering & Technology (BUET), Dhaka  
*Thesis: Metal-Insulator-Metal Ring Resonator Design for Sensing Applications* **Advisor:** Dr. Zahurul Islam

## RESEARCH SUMMARY

**First authored publications in top-tier venues (3):** **Oakland(x1), ASPLOS(x2)**  
**Other publications (5)**

## SELECTED PUBLICATIONS

1. **Jubayer Mahmud** & Matthew Hicks. *UnTrustZone: Systematic Accelerated Aging to Expose On-chip Secrets*. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. (To appear Oakland'24[[Link](#)])
2. **Jubayer Mahmud** & Matthew Hicks. *Invisible Bits: Hiding Secret Messages in SRAM's Analog Domain*. International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS'22)
3. **Jubayer Mahmud** & Matthew Hicks. *SRAM Has No Chill: Exploiting Power Domain Separation to Steal Onchip Secrets*. International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS'22)
4. **Jubayer Mahmud** & Ujjwal Guin. *A Robust, Low-Cost and Secure Authentication Scheme for IoT Applications*. Cryptography 4.1 (2020)
5. **Jubayer Mahmud**, Millican Spencer, Ujjawal Guin, and Vishwani Agrawal. *Delay Fault Testing: Present and Future*. IEEE VLSI Test Symposium (VTS'19).
6. Benjamin Cyr, **Jubayer Mahmud**, Ujjwal Guin. *Low-Cost and Secure Firmware Obfuscation Method for Protecting Electronic Systems from Cloning*. IEEE Internet of Things Journal (2019)

## EXPERIENCE & INTERNSHIPS

Virginia Tech, VA	Graduate Research Assistant	01/20– now
ForteMedia, Inc, Santa Clara, CA	Graduate Engineering Intern	Summer 2018, 2019
Auburn University, AL	Graduate Research Assistant	08/17 - 05/19

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Virginia Tech	ECE 4514: Digital Design II	GTA	Fall 2019
Auburn University	ELEC 6970: Hardware Security I	GTA	Fall 2018
Daffodil International University, Dhaka	Undergraduate electronics courses	Lecturer	09/16-07/17

## TECHNICAL SKILLS

- Hardware/software co-design • Applied Cryptography • Cloud FPGA design (aws F1)
- Trusted execution environment: ARM TrustZone, SGX • Linux kernel, Coreboot, OpenOCD/JTAG.
- C, Assembly (x86 & ARM), Verilog, Python • Cadence Design Tools, Hspice.

## SELECTED PROJECTS

- **Exploiting SRAM data remanence to design attacks:** Leveraged SRAM's analog characteristics and power domain separation to design **Volt Boot** and **UntrustZone**. Volt Boot shows

how to create artificial data retention across power cycles in an SoC 100% accuracy. Using a secure boot or a trusted execution environment can be potential mitigation, which inspired a more robust form of attack, UntrustZone, that still exfiltrates data/code (> 98% accuracy) from on-chip SRAM using accelerated transistor wear-out. **Outcome:** two top-tier conference publications.

- **Defenses leveraging SRAM data remanence:** Designed data hiding & SoC anti-counterfeit systems utilizing SRAM’s analog behavior, specifically circuit aging. **Invisible bits** is a steganography scheme that creates a covert, cryptographically secure but plausibly deniable information transfer channel in the hardware. Further applied imprinting and data retention voltage techniques for detecting and avoiding recycled, remarked, and cloned chips. **Outcome:** Three papers [Invisible bits, Retain-the-date, SKU-RAM (under review)]
- **Cloud FPGA localization:** Developed a cloud FPGA localization system using dynamic timing faults in functionally valid circuits, circumventing AWS security restrictions on hardware DNA access. This entirely **on-chip** signature extraction method achieves **>99% accuracy, operates 13X faster, and costs 92% less** than the state-of-the-art (under review).
- **Hardware-assisted firmware obfuscation:** Developed a custom MIPS core featuring a reorder cache in the instruction fetch unit, enabling dynamic and transparent reconstruction of control flow from obfuscated firmware. **Outcome:** a journal paper.

*Graduate course projects*

- **Hardware/Software Co-Design:**
  - Machine learning inference: Developed a NIOS-II-based ML accelerator, focusing on resource-efficient heterogeneous computing through custom instruction & hardware/software co-design. Achieved **2500x** speed boost compared to baseline software-only implementation using ARM-FPGA system.
  - Crypto acceleration engines: Implemented RSA hardware engine using Radix-2 Montgomery multiplication and Chinese remainder theorem. AES Engine: Crafted for Hardware Trojan demonstrations.
- **Linux kernel programming:**
  - Intra-Process isolation: Utilized Intel’s *Memory Protection Key (MPK)* and *libmpk* to explore user-space memory permission control at page granularity.
  - Distributed shared memory synchronization: Implemented MESI protocol to synchronize shared pages across multiple Linux processes/machines using user-space page-fault handling (user-faultfd).

<b>PRESENTATION &amp; TALKS</b>	<b>Invisible Bits: Hiding Secret Messages in SRAM’s Analog Domain.</b> (ASPLOS)	2022
	<b>SRAM Has No Chill: Exploiting Power Domain Separation to Steal Onchip Secrets.</b> (ASPLOS)	2022
	<b>SRAM PUF-based device authentication protocol hardware demo.</b> (HOST)	2019
	<b>Graduate Research Showcasing.</b> Auburn University	2018
	<b>Hardware Trojan showcasing (hardware &amp; poster)</b> NAE Grand Challenges Scholars Program	2018

<b>AWARDS</b>	NSF travel grant	ASPLOS, Switzerland	2022
	NSF travel grant	Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security & Trust	2019
	Graduate school tuition fellowship	Auburn University	2017-19
	Best project award	Tensilica Xtensa Embedded-DSP design contest, India	2016
	Dean’s List award	BUET	

<b>SERVICE</b>	<b>Reviewer:</b>		
	– IEEE Internet of Things Journal		2022
	– Journal of Hardware and Systems Security		2023
	<b>External Reviewer:</b>		
	• ASPLOS’24 • IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I’21 • VLSID’19 • DAC’19 • GLSVLSI’19 • Journal of Hardware and Systems Security’19 • IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration Systems’17 &’18 • VLSI Test Symposium’18 • Transactions on Multi-Scale Computing Systems’18		